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Abstract
Digital technologies have provided governments across the world with new tools of political and social control. The devel-
opment of algorithmic governance in China is particularly alarming, where plans have been released to develop a digital
Social Credit System (SCS). Still in an exploratory stage, the SCS, as a collection of national and local pilots, is framedofficially
as an all-encompassing project aimed at building trust in society through the regulation of both economic and social behav-
iors. Grounded in the case of China’s SCS, this article interrogates the application of algorithmic rating to expanding areas
of everyday life through the lens of the Frankfurt School’s critique of instrumental reason. It explores how the SCS reduces
the moral and relational dimension of trust in social interactions, and how algorithmic technologies, thriving on a moral
economy characterized by impersonality, impede the formation of trust and trustworthiness as moral virtues. The algorith-
mic rationality underlying the SCS undermines the ontology of relational trust, forecloses its transformative power, and
disrupts social and civic interactions that are non-instrumental in nature. Re-reading and extending the Frankfurt School’s
theorization on reason and the technological society, especially the works of Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Habermas, this
article reflects on the limitations of algorithmic technologies in social governance. A Critical Theory perspective awakens
us to the importance of human reflexivity on the use and circumscription of algorithmic rating systems.
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1. Introduction
The development of big data and algorithmic technolo-
gies has enabled governments across the world to fash-
ion new modes of political and social control. An epito-
me of this emerging trend of algorithmic governance is
China’s plan to build a Social Credit System (SCS), which
has evoked fear internationally of an Orwellian techno-
dystopia. The system is intended to aggregate data on
both natural and legal persons in order tomonitor, evalu-
ate, and modify their actions through a joint mechanism
of reward and punishment. Instead of seeing the SCS
as an exclusive symbol of Chinese authoritarianism, we
should situate it in a global context of algorithmic govern-
mentality while recognizing its embeddedness in local
political and cultural traditions. The use of algorithmic
analysis in governmental practice is not unique to China,
but is in place in Western countries as well, especially
with respect to policing and criminal justice (e.g., Angwin,
Larson, Mattu, & Kirchner, 2016; Dencik, Hintz, Redden,
& Warne, 2018; Richardson, Schultz, & Crawford, 2019).
A close look at the China case will inform larger discus-
sion of algorithmic governance across the world. Framed
by the Chinese government as an endeavor to build trust
in society, the SCS represents the colonization of the
everyday life by ascendant logics of quantification, mea-
surability, and efficiency—or in short, the quantification
of the social (Mau, 2019). But can trust be built through
algorithmic quantification and top-down schemes of
governance aimed to nudge, constrain, and manipulate
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human behavior into compliance? Although a growing
literature has empirically investigated the mechanics of
the SCS in China, this fundamental theoretical question
remains unanswered.
This article addresses this void and interrogates,
more broadly, the increasing embrace of algorithmic
rationality in social governance. I first sketch out the cur-
rent shape of the SCS in China in relation to evolving dis-
courses around it, and propose a conception of the SCS
as a project of moral engineering with a focus on trust-
building. Then, I centralize and delve into the moral and
relational dimension of trust in social interactions. In the
rest of the article, I draw on the Frankfurt theorists’ cri-
tique of formalized or instrumental reason, particularly
the works of Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Habermas, to
elaborate on the ways in which the SCS—as an epitome
of the quantification of the social—disenchants and flat-
tens moral values such as trust and trustworthiness.
2. Beyond Surveillance: Social Credit System as Moral
Engineering
China’s SCS has attracted global attention since 2014,
after the Party-state released the Planning Outline
for the Establishment of a Social Credit System
(“Establishment of a social credit system,” 2015), which
laid out goals to put the system in place by 2020. A sim-
ple Google search of China’s SCS returns links toWestern
media coverage that compares it to the dystopian world
depicted in the Black Mirror episode, “Nosedive” (Schur,
Jones, & Wright, 2016), where people rate each oth-
er for every interaction, which impacts their socioeco-
nomic statuses. A growing amount of research in this
area has debunked these reductionist caricatures (e.g.,
Ahmed, 2019; Creemers, 2018; Ohlberg, Ahmed, & Lang,
2017), and has shown that, far from an established all-
encompassing system that assigns everyone a single
score, the current state of the SCS consists of dozens
of government-led pilot projects at local or national lev-
els and various commercial ones run by tech giants such
as Alibaba and Tencent. At the national/central level,
the National Development and Reform Commission,
the Supreme People’s Court, and the People’s Bank of
China, among others, have been taking the lead in initi-
ating nationwide SCS pilots, including the formation of
an interministerial joint conference, a national financial
credit information database, and a portal called Credit
China that publicizes SCS policies as well as blacklists
and red lists. At the municipal and county levels, local
governments have been experimenting with their own
SCS systems, many of which are based on quantified
scoring. Although these programs are led by the gov-
ernment, the collaboration between governmental and
commercial actors have also been noteworthy, with the
latter providing strong technological and infrastructural
support. While commercial SCS experiments are more
akin to loyalty programs (Creemers, 2018), those run by
the government are more invasive and wider in scope.
One of the most notorious examples of government-
led pilots is the case of Rongcheng, a county-level city in
Shandong Province, where residents are assigned scores
on a scale of 1,000 and classified into descending lev-
els from A to D. The evaluation system covers a range
of behaviors and activities: economic, social, civic, and
moral. Misdemeanors, such as jaywalking, littering, and
getting traffic tickets, lead to score deduction and pun-
ishment, while exemplary behaviors, such as caring for
elderly parents, helping others, donating to charity, and
volunteering for public programs, translate into score
bumps and benefits (Mistreanu, 2018; Ohlberg et al.,
2017). Benefits may come in the form of deposit waivers
for bike rental, discounts on heating bills, or advanta-
geous terms on bank loans (Mistreanu, 2018), while
penalties include limited access to government benefits
and restrictions on market entry (Creemers, 2018).
Admittedly, not all SCS pilots utilize quantified
schemes; some renowned ones simply take the forms of
blacklists and red lists, such as the judgement debtors
list administered by the Chinese Supreme People’s Court.
However, there has been growing reliance on quantifi-
cation across local trials. Liu (2019) documents that by
mid-2019, 21 Chinese cities had enacted their own quan-
tified SCS pilots, and 27 more cities were in the prepara-
tory stage. Notable cases include Fuzhou’s Jasmine (Moli)
score that rates citizens on a 0–1,000 scale, and Suzhou’s
Osmanthus (Guihua) score that assigns citizens up to
200 points.
The SCS represents the Party-state’s latest endeav-
or to modernize and automate its social governance.
The root of this cybernetic mode of control can be
traced all the way back to the 1970s and 1980s, when
the Party leadership and intelligentsia began discussing
the automation of social governance. The cybernetic
imagination advanced by Qian Xuesen, China’s Father of
Rocketry, and Song Jian, a cybernetics expert, shaped
former president Hu Jintao’s concept of scientific devel-
opment, where scientific and engineering approaches
were imagined as solutions to problems in the social
domain (Hoffman, 2017). In the early 1990s, the idea
of building a credit system was broached in response
to Chinese firms’ debt default problem; in 2002, then-
President Jiang Zemin voiced the demand for a SCS to
regulate market behavior (Liang, Das, & Kostyuk, 2018).
Early efforts in building the credit system focused primar-
ily on the financial sector; the Planning Outline released
in 2014, however, significantly extended the scope of the
project to the social domain.
Western media coverage and some scholarship on
the Chinese SCS heavily focus on the issue of surveil-
lance, privacy, and political control; Liang et al. (2018),
for instance, frame this project as a ‘state surveillance
infrastructure.’ Yet surveillance is not the end, but a
means through which the authorities bring the citizens’
behaviors—potentially political but mostly civic—in line
with the official ideologies and values. The 2014 Planning
Outline clearly indicates themoral education component
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of the SCS, which is aimed to cultivate a culture of
trust and integrity. The SCS, in this sense, fits into the
Party’s long tradition of ‘spiritual civilization’ campaigns.
Hence, I propose an alternative framework of the SCS
as a project of moral engineering with emphasis on
trust-building.
Some scholars, such as Lee (2014), characterize China
as a low-trust society, where distrust of strangers is
prevalent largely because the society is traditionally
structured around familial or kinship ties. Moreover, the
informal networks of trust were undermined through
incidents of political turmoil, such as the Cultural
Revolution. Post-reformChinawitnessed rapid economic
growth along with unethical get-rich-quick schemes and
the corruption of moral integrity. A slew of social issues
has become disheartening over the past decades, such
as food safety, corruption, fraud, tax evasion, incivility
etc. Officially, the SCS has been framed as a mechanism
for building social trust and a culture of integrity; it cov-
ers a range of relationships among the state, the corpo-
rate sector, and individual citizens. The 2014 Planning
Outline lays out the goal to build a joint mechanism of
reward and punishment, which “mak[es] it so that the
trustworthy benefit at every turn and the untrustworthy
can’t move an inch” (“Establishment of a social credit sys-
tem,” 2015). Local pilots have also significantly focused
on the cultivation of trustworthiness and civility, such as
the Rongcheng case and, more recently, the controver-
sial and short-lived Suzhou Civility Code pilot that encour-
aged citizens to sort their trash, follow traffic rules, and
engage in volunteer services (Chiu, 2020). In this sense,
the SCS is an extension of the Party-state’s lasting scheme
to cultivate its citizens’ suzhi (human quality).
Public opinion in China has appeared to embrace
the role of the SCS to enhance trust and civility in soci-
ety. A nationwide survey on Chinese citizens’ percep-
tion of the SCS revealed high levels of approval: 80%
of the 2,209 respondents either somewhat or strong-
ly approved the system (Kostka, 2019). Privacy infringe-
ment is not the dominant frame people use to interpret
the SCS; rather, the initiative is often considered con-
ducive to promoting honest dealings in society and econ-
omy (Kostka, 2019).
In this sense, the SCS can be construed as a project
of moral engineering. Pre-digital or non-digital strategies
in this regard include promoting model citizens, enact-
ing the dang’an system with dossiers kept on individu-
als’ trajectories (Jiang, 2020), and promulgating spiritu-
al civilization campaigns such as ‘Eight Virtues and Eight
Shames.’ Of course, the SCS, with the use of digital tech-
nologies, differs greatly from its antecedents in terms of
its workings and underlying logic. Much of the extant lit-
erature on the SCS either tiptoes around or only scratch-
es the surface of the issue of trust. This article seeks to fill
this void by returning to basic questions on the ontology
and ethics of trust in relation to the technologization of
social governance.
3. Trust as a Moral Concept: Grounding Social Trust in
Moral Philosophy
3.1. Trust as a Floating Signifier in Official Planning of
the Social Credit System
The term ‘trust’ is recurring in the 2014 Planning Outline
on the construction of the SCS. In some sense, it can
be read as the authorities’ modus operandi to uti-
lize auratic terms such as ‘trust’ as a justificatory cov-
er for political and ideological control. The notion of
‘trust’ is thus reduced to what Marcuse (1964/2002)
calls a self-validating ‘magic-ritual’ formula hammered
and re-hammered into people’s minds—a mere govern-
ing device that precludes the development of meaning.
There may be some level of sincerity in the authorities’
intention to reshape the moral landscape of the society,
but whenever trust is invoked, its content is taken for
granted as a given that entails no explication.
In fact, trust is an exceedingly nebulous concept that
can be defined from different perspectives. What com-
plicates things even further is that the all-encompassing
and slippery word for ‘trust’ in Chinese (xin) can, in
other contexts, mean ‘credit,’ ‘integrity,’ ‘confidence,’
‘belief,’ or ‘faith.’ There has been no clear analytic distinc-
tion made between these synonyms in the official dis-
course around the SCS. In fact, it is exactly by invoking
the ambiguous notion of xin that the authorities man-
age to conflate the notion of trust with its numerous
synonyms, thus quietly extending the scope of its con-
trol from market behavior to social and civic conduct.
The 2014 Planning Outline envisions the SCS to be a
panacea for problems in four different domains: adminis-
trative and government affairs, business and commercial
activities, judicial affairs, and social interactions. In the
document, the Chinese words zhengxin (financial credit)
and chengxin (trustworthiness or integrity) are both used
under the overarching rubric of ‘social credit.’ Moreover,
input data in the design of local pilots often include
variables from different sectors—administrative, judicial,
economic, and social. While overdue loans or legal vio-
lations may lead to low scores, such deeds as donat-
ing blood and volunteering would be rewarded in local
pilots conducted in cities such as Xiamen and Fuzhou
(Lewis, 2019). The rewards and punishment also apply
to a wide range of scenarios that impact people’s life,
such as housing, employment, medical care, and public
services, among others. In one extreme case, a Chinese
dating website boosted visibility of users with higher
Sesame credit score—a commercial scoring system creat-
ed by Alibaba—placing their profiles in prominent spots
(Hatton, 2015).
What sets the SCS apart fromWestern credit scoring
systems is the state’s attempt to regulate not only eco-
nomic activities but also social behaviors, and the overt
top-down scheme of reward and punishment stretch-
ing into private domains of everyday life. In this pro-
cess, trust becomes a floating signifier across different
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sectors and contexts, whose meanings seem to be self-
evident yet never clearly delineated. ‘Trustworthiness’
(as in social interactions) is conflated with ‘creditworthi-
ness’ (as inmarket transactions) or even compliancewith
regulations (as in civil and judicial domains). Indifferent
to the specific workings and meanings of trust in differ-
ent contexts, the SCS is largely built on the rationale of
pre-existing quantified ratings of creditworthiness. Yet is
it sensible to quantify and rate trustworthiness, a moral
virtue, based on a FICO-score-like model? This is a basic
question too readily brushed aside.
Admittedly, even the financial credit rating per se is
not free from associations with moral concepts such as
honesty and integrity (Lauer, 2017); credit scores, when
taken far beyond their original turf and used as prox-
ies of other virtues in hiring and promotion processes,
can yield damaging effects on one’s life (O’Neil, 2016).
Nonetheless, credit scoring is widely accepted in many
circumstances due to their efficiency in regulating eco-
nomic and transactional activities within certain rule-
bound contexts, typically marketplaces. Compared to
the moralization of creditworthiness, the SCS’s logic of
quantifying morality is equally, if not more, pernicious
as it, by design, applies a marketplace-based govern-
mentality to the non-economic realm—particularly the
social, the civil, and the interpersonal. Trust in market-
place and business settings is oftentimes calculative—
and perhaps rightfully so—because transactions with-
in this context are heavily instrumental, whereas trust
in wider social (and non-economic) interactions is rela-
tional, as it is anchored in “social relationships when
there are strong beliefs about the goodwill, honesty,
and good faith efforts of others” (Poppo, Zhou, & Li,
2016, p. 724). The muddling of calculative and relational
dimensions of trust amounts to the confusion between
what Habermas (1984) would call instrumental/strategic
action and communicative action. While strategic action
strives for influence and instrumental ends, commu-
nicative action seeks to reach genuine understanding
(Habermas, 1984). To Habermas, the issue with techno-
logical modernization lies in the encroachment of tech-
nical efficiency in the realm of communicative action
(Pippin, 1995). The urge to quantify trust in social inter-
actions is reflective of this trend. Yet to see trust as a
calculable matter fails to do justice to the rich moral con-
notations of relational trust, that is, a general belief in
the integrity of others during social interactions.
3.2. Trust and Moral Autonomy
To ground relational trust in moral philosophy, I fol-
low Seligman’s (1997) comparison of trust and its syn-
onym ‘confidence.’ In part informed by Luhmann (1988),
Seligman (1997) posits that confidence hinges on one’s
perception of the reliability of a social system and its
enforcement of role expectations; in other words, confi-
dence is placed upon institutional authority, such as reli-
gion and kinship in traditional societies, and the market
or the state in modern societies (Lee, 2014). In contrast,
trust emerges in response to “the breakup of primor-
dial forms of social organization and the greater differ-
entiation of social roles,” which results in more intersub-
jective negotiation and higher contingency (Lee, 2014,
p. 5). To put it in a nutshell, when confidence in a sys-
tem of social role expectations can no longer be taken
for granted—and when the possibility of dissonance in
role fulfilment arises—there emerges the need for trust
as a form of social relations (Seligman, 1997). Seligman,
following Luhmann, thus locates trust in the realm of
interpersonal and social connections, or in the encounter
between self and alter, recognizing the moral autonomy
of both.
Moreover, Seligman stresses that trust, different
from confidence, implies risk and uncertainty. Trust is
incurred oftenwhen “the acts, character, or intentions of
the other cannot be confirmed” (Seligman, 1997, p. 21).
While trust involves uncertainty and vulnerability, con-
fidence often pertains to the reliability of the other’s
words, commitments, or acts based on past knowledge
and future possibilities of sanctions (Seligman, 1997).
Trust, in this sense, also differs from a contract. A con-
tract explicitly lays out the agreed-upon terms and rules
binding the involved parties, with the threat of sanctions,
whereas trust operates upon the freedom from such for-
mal agreement and deterrence. That is not to say that
there is no obligation to be trustworthy, but this obli-
gation “arises from moral agency and autonomy, from
the freedom and responsibility, of the participants to the
interaction” (Seligman, 1997, p. 6).
Trust in social interactions should then be construed
not as an inert substance, but as a relational practice that
involves moral agency and autonomy. To take Seligman’s
framework further, I echo Flores and Solomon (1998) in
locating trust within a “dynamic emotional relationship
which entails responsibility…[and] a set of social prac-
tices, defined by our choices, to trust or not to trust”
(p. 205). This kind of trust carries a moral valence.
Both trusting others and being trustworthy aremoral
virtues, because trust-giving requires the trustor’s benev-
olence to prevail over the unpredictability of others’
intentions and over potential risks, and being trustwor-
thy entails the trustee’s responsibility to fulfill promises
and expectations as well as to reciprocate the trustor’s
kindness. Trust thus subsumes risks, enabling interac-
tions that would otherwise be impossible. Of course, as
a choice, to trust or not to trust is never guaranteed, and
may involve some level of calculation. But trust in social
interactions is never a mere function of such calculation.
A person may choose to trust someone despite the low
confidence in the latter’s ability to reciprocate. In the
worst-case scenario, the trust relationship breaks down
eventually; and the best outcome is that the trustee,
moved by the trustor’s sincerity, manages to honor the
trust relationship against all odds. Trust as such never
preempts any possible trajectory and gives space to the
moral agency of both parties involved.
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As moral virtues, trust and trustworthiness in the
realm of communicative action naturally resist quantifi-
cation and datafication. The impulse to quantify trust-
worthiness through algorithms—and to use such quan-
tification as the basis of trust-giving—is symptomatic of
the deepening technologization of society and instru-
mentalization of reason. To critically examine the ascen-
dant trend to quantify moral worth, we may revisit
and extend the Frankfurt School scholars’ trenchant cri-
tique of the technological society and formalistic ratio-
nality in mid-20th century. Informed by their theories,
I discuss in the rest of the article how the algorithmic
rationality (Lowrie, 2017) or algorithmic governmentality
(Rouvroy, 2013) animating the SCS contradicts the ontol-
ogy of relational trust and undermines its formation in
social/civic interactions.
4. A Critical Theory Perspective on the Social Credit
System and Trust-Building
4.1. From Instrumental Reason to Algorithmic
Rationality
One of the main concerns of the first-generation
Frankfurt theorists, especially Horkheimer and Marcuse,
is the interplay between technology, rationality, and dom-
ination. They take issue with the ascendancy of late cap-
italism and techno-science as the twin forces of domina-
tion,which undergird a type of instrumental reason. Their
discussion of instrumental reason and unreflective tech-
nical process is largely informed by Weber’s (1921/1978)
distinction between formal rationality and substantive
rationality (Gunderson, 2015). Weber (1919/1946) traces
in modern bureaucracies the displacement of tradition-
al and value-laden understanding of the world with a
technical and impersonal mode of thinking and behav-
ing, oriented towards efficiency and instrumental goals;
this type of formal-rational understanding disenchants
the lifeworld and erodes traditional values.Weber’s theo-
ry influenced Horkheimer’s (1947/2004) notion of instru-
mental reason and Marcuse’s (1964/2002) discussion of
technological rationality.
Horkheimer (1947/2004) refers to the formal rational-
ity as subjective reason/rationality. In Eclipse of Reason,
he deals at length with the process whereby objective
reason, characteristic of the pre-modern era, has been
replaced by subjective reason in modern societies. With
objective reason, one judges actions and objects as good
or bad, according to their harmony (or the lack there-
of) with the objective world as a reasonable system. The
subjective reason, however, signifies the formalization
and instrumentalization of reason and manifests itself in
one’s “ability to calculate probabilities and thereby to co-
ordinate the right means with a given end” (Horkheimer,
1947/2004, p. 4). Subjective reason is formalized in that
it is purged of moral and aesthetic reflections and con-
cerned merely with “the adequacy of procedures for
purposes more or less taken for granted” (Horkheimer,
1947/2004, p. 3), thus precluding deliberation on the
meaning and merit of substantive goals; it is instrumen-
talized in that it is aimed only to attain subjective inter-
ests or self-preservation—the utmost ‘reasonable’ goal
in modern societies. Subjective reason is incapable of
evaluating the quality of an object or action in terms of
good or bad, and is only interested in their utility.
Frankfurt theorists associate this type of instrumen-
tal rationality to modern science and technology, which
are firmly grounded in positivism and naïve empiricism.
As Horkheimer (1947/2004, p. 53) contends, the posi-
tivists reduce science to its empirical procedures, make
it “absolute as truth,” and rely on the scientific successes
to justify their methods. Positivism separates fact from
value and, when extended to the social domain, leads to
the reification of life and perception and the erosion of
human agency.
In the same vein,Marcuse (1964/2002) discusses how
the operational thinking of positivist science treats any
concept as nomore than a set of operations; and how, on
a societal level, the metaphysical conception of subjectiv-
ity is replaced by what he calls ‘a one-dimensional soci-
ety,’ where people’s thoughts and behaviors are molded
in a way that conforms to the dominant power in soci-
ety with the aid of unreflective technological progress.
To Marcuse (1964/2002), science and technology in late
capitalist societies are not neutral, because, as a socio-
historical project, they operate in a given universe of dis-
course and action, and are already structured in a partic-
ular way. Domination in modern society, he argues, not
only perpetuates itself through technology but as tech-
nology, in the sense that technology at once legitimates
and glosses over the dominant power with its aura of
objectivity. Both Horkheimer and Marcuse point to the
paradox where rationality progresses into irrationality.
Central to the workings of modern science and
technology is the logic of quantification and calculabil-
ity. Not only is there a latent link among quantifica-
tion/calculation, knowability, and domination in theory,
but in praxis, there has been a long history in which
bureaucrats and technocrats have deployed statistical
and mathematical tools for social governance in ear-
ly modern societies (e.g., Desrosières, 1998; Foucault,
2007; Porter, 1996). With the increasing mechanization
of governance embraced by bureaucratic institutions,
numbers have been relied on as a vital means of classi-
fication and control.
Frankfurt theorists trenchantly critique the expan-
sion of this logic of quantification and calculability.
Obsession with calculability, according to Horkheimer
(1947/2004), supplants meanings with function or effect.
The only ‘reasonable’ words are those that can be tech-
nically calculated for possibilities. Moral judgment about
good or bad, in their unverifiable forms, are deemed
useless. To make these evaluative criteria ‘reasonable,’
scientific operationalization is entailed; that is how the
incalculable enters into the scientific horizon—“through
a series of reductions” (Marcuse, 1964/2002, p. 142).
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The quantification of qualities, Marcuse (1964/2002)
argues, constitutes a particular way of seeing, anticipat-
ing, and projecting, one that separates the reality from
all inherent ends and paves the way for domination.
Under the logic of quantification, values and qualities
“lose their mysterious and uncontrollable character” and
“appear as calculable manifestations of (scientific) ratio-
nality” (Marcuse, 1964/2002, p. 172): They aremutilated
and reduced to their behavioral translation.
The algorithmic rationality that animates the SCS is
an extension of the instrumental or technological ratio-
nality in Frankfurt theorists’ critiques. Nonetheless, algo-
rithmic rationality also differs from traditional scientif-
ic rationality and signifies a novel epistemic paradigm.
While the sine qua non of traditional scientific rational-
ity has been the work of proof (Lakatos, 1976), the goal
of data-driven algorithms is not to prove anything, but
to achieve feasibility, practicality, and efficiency (Lowrie,
2017). Algorithmic processes bypass the systems of veri-
fication associated with traditional science that “usually
appear essential to attest to the robustness, truth, valid-
ity or legitimacy of claims and hypotheses formulated
about reality” (Rouvroy, 2013, p. 151). Algorithmic analy-
sis is not about causes, but rather about correlations and
probabilities based on patterns of data.
The workings of algorithms are undergirded by a
type of anticipatory rationality (Amoore, 2013; Gillespie,
2014; Hong & Szpunar, 2019), aimed at predicting and
preempting possible futures. It “separates the individu-
als from their possibility of not actualizing what they are
capable [of], or their possibility of not being subjected
to what they are likely to be subjected to” (Rouvroy &
Stiegler, 2016, pp. 10–11). In this way, the preemptive
logic acts on the present while also shaping the future,
actualizing some potentialities while usurping others.
Yet this process is smoothed over by the cold charisma
of digital technologies that conjures up an aura of objec-
tivity and impartiality (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Gillespie,
2014). Although algorithms are often interconnected
with human experts, they are also expected to act on
their ownand thus possess their ownagency and authori-
ty. This is reminiscent of Horkheimer’s (1947/2004, p. 87)
diagnosis that “the machine has dropped the driver.”
The Frankfurt School offers a broader historical
framework for the reflection of algorithmic rationality
that progresses from older forms of scientific and tech-
nological rationality. It shows that the progression of
technological rationality is not inevitable but historically
contingent, shaped by shifting configurations of political
and economic interests. What is hinted at but underex-
plored in their theorization is that such a shift to instru-
mental reason is as philosophical and epistemological
as it is moral. The rejection of an objective moral order
itself presupposes a certain view on morality or a cer-
tain moral economy—to borrow Daston’s (1995) term,
namely a system of values carrying affective and moral
valences. Objectivity and impartiality are part and par-
cel of the moral economy on which instrumental rea-
son thrives. In the following, I shall extend the Frankfurt
School’s theory on instrumental reason through the lens
of moral economy, and apply it to the case of quantified
SCS pilots. I argue that algorithmic scoring of trustwor-
thiness defeats the purpose of moral engineering as it
undermines the ontology of relational trust by authoriz-
ing amoral economy antithetical to the workings of trust
in social and civic relationships.
4.2. Disenchanting Trust: The Paradox of Moral
Engineering
As an embodiment of the formalization of reason, the
quantified SCS pilots seeks to transmute trustworthi-
ness into a calculative and knowable matter represented
by standardized numerical values. Admittedly, in certain
rule-bound contexts such as a marketplace, technolo-
gies of quantification have some merits in mediating
exchanges and transactions. Porter (1996), for instance,
argues that quantification as “a technology of distance”
is suited for communication extending beyond the bound-
aries of locality and community (p. ix); it facilitates intel-
lectual exchanges and economic transactions since num-
bers render “dissimilar desires, needs, and expectations”
commensurable (p. 86). It is worth noting that Porter’s
focus rests on the tension between human expertise
and mechanical objectivity in professional and scientif-
ic fields (e.g., actuarial science, accounting, engineering,
medicine) instead of intersubjective encounters in the pri-
vate domain. In fact, technologies of quantification were
developed to replace personal trust in situations where
institutional authority was weak (Daston, 1995; Porter,
1996). In this sense, the rise of technologies of quantifica-
tion is symptomatic of the declining personal trust rather
than a solution to restoring it. Likewise, the quantified SCS
systems in China could be understood as a symptom of
the declining moral authority of the communist ideology.
In the present day, while quantification of trust-
worthiness in transactional relationships (e.g., rating of
vendors on Amazon and ratings of drivers on Uber) mini-
mizes risks and transaction costs, its application to trust
formation in non-instrumental interactions is problemat-
ic. The all-encompassing design of the SCS ignores such
contextual differences. Notwithstanding its moralizing
framing, the SCS as a project of moral engineering is
self-defeating for various reasons. Since oft-mentioned
issues of privacy infringement, opacity, inaccuracy, and
bias have been thoroughly explored in the works on
politics of algorithms, they will not be belabored here.
Instead, my focus is placed upon how quantified SCS sys-
tems impede the formation of relational trust.
First, as discussed above, relational trust is best
construed as a moral virtue at the discretion of individu-
als, but the quantified SCS pilots contradict its ontology.
The technological quantification of trust relies on amoral
economy of impersonality and impartiality, particular-
ly “the reining in of judgment, the submission to rules,
the reduction of meanings” (Daston, 1995, p. 19). It is
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precisely a moral economy inhospitable to the forma-
tion of relational trust, which entails the exercise, rather
than the withholding, of judgment. In the moral econo-
my characterized by impersonality and impartiality, indi-
viduals are treated as mere technical objects rather
than “ethical or aesthetic or political agent[s]” (Marcuse,
1964/2002, p. 150). They become ‘one-dimensional’ not
only inMarcuse’s sense of theword—as their critical con-
sciousness is whittled away—but also because they are
collapsed into one-dimensional digital profiles, into dig-
its and numbers. Accordingly, such systems shift atten-
tion from human relationships to technical efficacy, and
thereby relegate trust to mere confidence in technolo-
gies. I have discussed above the distinction between
trust and confidence, and how the official framing of the
SCS strategically muddles this distinction. The confusion
of these two concepts is, in some sense, a result of the
increasing technologization of society at large. O’Reilly
(2013), for instance, touts the benefits of algorithmic reg-
ulation, including the affordance of data-driven reputa-
tion systems, which he believes could “improve the out-
comes for citizens with less effort by overworked regu-
lators” (p. 294). Technologies are imagined as solutions
for social problems. This type of ‘solutionism’ (Morozow,
2014) resonates with the elitist cybernetic thinking in
China and with the project of the SCS. It appears sensi-
ble that issues of trust in a technological societywould be
readily resolved through technological means. However,
as Nissenbaum (1999) cautions, the attempt to attain
trust through technical means (e.g., cybersecurity mea-
sures) is misguided, since when we seek to attain securi-
ty, we are usurping the role of trust. She cites evidence
showing that the extrinsic constraints, such as surveil-
lance, could ultimately diminish trust because intrinsic
motivation is stifled.
The reduction of trust to confidence in technolo-
gies prompts tactical maneuvers such as gaming. Instead
of empowering individuals to build and exercise trust,
the scoring systems nudge them to gain more points.
Individuals only need to come up with whatever meth-
ods to increase the score—or to coordinate input vari-
ables with expected output.Whether thesemethods are
morally good or not becomes irrelevant. Individuals no
longer need to interact with others to determine trust-
worthiness and the quality of trust relationships; rather,
they are prompted to interact more frequently with algo-
rithms to monitor their own standings. This transference
of evaluation from human reason to algorithmic ratio-
nality is a contemporary manifestation of the formal-
ized/instrumental reason, a type of rationality only con-
cerned with the coordination of effective means with
taken-for-granted ends.
Second, the technological quantification of trust, by
actualizing certain possibilities while preempting oth-
ers based on cost-benefit analysis, forecloses the trans-
formative power of trust. Trust is precious in social
relationships because it subsumes risks and enables
human interactions that would be otherwise impossi-
ble. Although it does not preclude the possible break-
down of a given relationship, it opens up possibilities
for the enhancement of human bonds and the nourish-
ment of moral characters. With the development of cold
and authoritative algorithms, such an unrealized space
of possibilities is converted into a verifiable temporal
sequence (Reigeluth, 2014). Through the reduction of
risk and uncertainty, algorithmic analysis of trustwor-
thiness inhibits, rather than enables, risk-taking behav-
ior and preempts its potentialities to generate favorable
outcomes. Moreover, the unreflective use of data about
individuals’ past behaviors to extrapolate their future
trajectories unfairly assumes the permanence of their
propensities while ignoring their potential to transform
themselves for the better, hence the perpetuation of
their undesirability. And it has been noted that the SCS
pilots lack uniform mechanisms for credit repair for low
scorers (Ohlberg et al., 2017). Some who commit mis-
demeanors may have undergone extenuating situations
to which the one-dimensional scoring system is indiffer-
ent. They may be helped through others’ willingness to
engage them instead of further punishment. The joint
reward and punishment mechanism envisioned in the
planning of the SCS risks duplicating punishment across a
range of unrelated domains and perpetuating the vicious
cycle that entraps low scorers. The preemptive logic of
algorithmic analysis annuls the transformative agency of
individuals in changing both others and themselves; it
contradicts the very end of moral engineering, which is
to cultivate subjects into better citizens.
Third, further disenchanting the moral concept of
trust is the SCS’s conflation of economic and social behav-
iors and its confusion of financial creditworthiness with
general trustworthiness. This tendency reflects a gener-
al process of the economization of society (Mau, 2019),
where economic logics carry over into non-economic
spheres. Intentionally extending the model of financial
credit rating to non-economic spheres makes it so that
ratings are no longer bounded within a particular mar-
ketplace, platform, or context; nor are they restricted
to rational-economic interactions, but spill over indis-
criminately to any spheres of life, giving rise to the reifi-
cation of values. Trustworthiness is not only rendered
calculable under the economic rationale, but is incen-
tivized with material rewards as well. In Shanghai, for
instance, a government-run social credit initiative offers
trustworthy youths one-year access to rent-free apart-
ments to reward their commitment to volunteer work
(Yu, Liu, & He, 2018). Yet the true aura of trustworthi-
ness and integrity as moral characters lies precisely in
their independence from the economic and instrumen-
tal logics and from external incentives. The attempts to
tether non-instrumental acts with material ends erode
the intrinsic authority of moral norms.
Last but not least, in the case of SCS, algorithms
that represent the will of the state loom above individ-
uals in social interactions as a mighty third party, dis-
rupting the trust relationship as a ‘moral party of two,’
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to borrow Bauman’s (1993) term (see also Lee, 2014).
Admittedly, since the socialist era, the Party-state has
sought to regulate the private life of citizens through
various means and organizations (e.g., neighborhood
committees). The use of quantified SCS systems to inter-
vene in communal or even familial relationships as well
as stranger sociality is an extension of this tradition.
In the Rongcheng SCS pilot, for instance, deeds worthy of
reward even include caring for elderly parents (Ohlberg
et al., 2017).Mediated through algorithmic technologies,
regulation of such private behavior operates quietly in
the background as if bypassing the political authority.
However, as the Frankfurt theorists caution, technolo-
gies are deeply connected with political power. The SCS
seeks to bring individuals into compliance with the hege-
monic values defined and promoted by the Party-state.
Yet this technologically enhanced attempt to engineer
morality and civility is self-defeating because it erodes
the very foundation on which moral and civic norms rest.
Looking at the state-led ‘spiritual civilization’ cam-
paigns in the 20th century China, Lee (2014) argues
that the state management of social interactions, espe-
cially stranger sociality, intervenes in and disrupts the
moral encounter where the self is supposed to assume
moral responsibility in their direct dealings with oth-
ers. Invoking Bauman’s view (1993) on ‘the moral party
of two,’ Lee (2014, p. 20) argues that a moral rela-
tion is “an affair of two, which cannot open up to a
third party or an authority figure.” Therefore, Lee (2014)
argues that morality cannot be entrusted to the state
or the market but should be cultivated via a robust
civil society. Extending Lee’s conception of moral rela-
tions as uncodifiable, I contend that trustworthiness
and civility will not thrive under the weight of state-
imposed and technologically mediated monitoring and
nudging. Although trust, trustworthiness, and civility
may be induced through top-down interventions such
as the promulgation of norms and moral education
(Luhmann, 1979; Nissenbaum, 1999), technologies alone
will not solve the core issue of cultivating a social climate
amenable to trust formation. To build a culture of integri-
ty, space should be carved out for individuals to practice
trust and build trust relations or civic bonds with others
in everyday settings through trial and error, instead of
falling back on a mighty third party for a confidence rat-
ing. Assuming the moral engineering project is sincere-
ly meant to cultivate a more civilized citizenry, it ought
to be, at the very least, decoupled from practices of law
enforcement and market regulation, which are currently
lumped together under the overarching rubric of the SCS.
5. Conclusions
This article examines China’s emerging SCS as a project
of moral engineering through the lens of Critical Theory,
addressing the fundamental theoretical question as to
whether the SCS could, as the official discourse propos-
es, provide a solution to the moral crisis in the rapidly
developing society. The quantified SCS pilots conflate
economic and social behaviors and rely on algorithmic
rationality for the evaluation of one’s trustworthiness,
disregarding the meanings and workings of trust and
trustworthiness in different contexts (e.g., marketplaces
vs. communities). The community-based relational trust
is crudely reduced to calculative trust; efficiency and
impersonality are privileged over subjective discretion
and autonomy. Such tendencies are symptomatic of
the increasing technologization of governance in mod-
ern societies. However, trust in social and civic interac-
tions needs to be cultivated and practiced through one’s
encounters with others; and trustworthiness is not to be
standardized and flattened into algorithmically generat-
ed numerical values.
Trust entails risk, uncertainty, responsibility, moral
autonomy, and possibilities without guarantee, where-
as these are precisely the elements that the algorithmic
rationality is aimed to foreclose. To build trust, we need a
different logic than instrumentality—a mode of thought
that militates against naive operationalism and ubiqui-
tous quantification (Marcuse, 1964/2002). We need to
put trust back into moral relations between individuals,
with their moral autonomy restored so that they can
make evaluations with their individual reason, emotion,
and judgment. It is misleading to believe that, in the case
of trust-building, technological rationality is superior to
traditional moral education, even though it may appear
more efficient. In fact, it is precisely such efficiency that
undermines the very cause of trust building.
Of course, it would be unhelpful and naïve to advo-
cate a romantic return to the pre-modern era; nor is
it the intention of the Frankfurt theorists. Instead, they
are envisioning possibilities to reconstruct technologies
in order to contribute to human freedom and possibili-
ties. This requires a shift away from the unreflective pos-
itive thinking to a critical consciousness. Hence, instead
of doing without technologies, we ought to reflect on
when (and how) to incorporate technologies into human
decision-making, and when (and how) to resist techno-
logical colonization of everyday life.We ought to contem-
plate the meanings of moral values as well as the quality
of our goals rather than merely the efficacy of tech-
nological means. A critical rethinking of ethical issues
around algorithms and governance through the case of
China’s emerging SCS also provides insights into existing
practices of credit/reputation rating, user profiling, and
algorithmic governance in Western societies. Re-reading
Critical Theory in the digital age heightens our vigilance
in the application of rating systems to expanding areas of
everyday life, and our reflexivity on the use and circum-
scription of these systems.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers
for their elaborate, insightful, and constructive feedback
on the previous version of this article.
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 140–149 147
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
Ahmed, S. (2019, May 1). The messy truth about social
credit. Logic Magazine. Retrieved from https://
logicmag.io/china/the-messy-truth-about-social-
credit
Amoore, L. (2013). The politics of possibility: Risk and
security beyond probability. Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press.
Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S., & Kirchner, L. (2016,
May 23). Machine bias: There’s software used across
the country to predict future criminals. And it’s
biased against blacks. ProPublica. Retrieved from
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-
risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
Bauman, Z. (1993). Postmodern ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
boyd, D., & Crawford, K. (2012). Critical questions for big
data. Information, Communication and Society, 15(5),
662–679.
Chiu, K. (2020, September 8). Suzhou city takes a page
from China’s social credit system with Civility Code
that rates citizens’ behaviour through a smart-




Creemers, R. (2018, May 22). China’s social credit sys-
tem: An evolving practice of control. SSRN. http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3175792
Daston, L. (1995). The moral economy of science. Osiris,
10, 2–24.
Dencik, L., Hintz, A., Redden, J., &Warne, H. (2018).Data
scores as governance: Investigating uses of citizen




Desrosières, A. (1998). The politics of large numbers: A
history of statistical reasoning. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Establishment of a social credit system. (2015, April 27).
China Law Translate. Retrieved from https://www.
chinalawtranslate.com/en/socialcreditsystem
Flores, F., & Solomon, R. C. (1998). Creating trust. Busi-
ness Ethics Quarterly, 8(2), 205–232.
Foucault, M. (2007). Security, territory, population: Lec-
tures at the Collège de France. New York, NY: Picador.
Gillespie, T. (2014). The relevance of algorithms. In T.
Gillespie, P. J. Boczkowski, & K. A. Foot (Eds.), Media
technologies: Essays on communication, materiali-
ty and society (pp. 167–193). Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Gunderson, R. (2015). Environmental sociology and the
Frankfurt School 1: Reason and capital. Environmen-
tal Sociology, 1(3), 224–235.
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action
(T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Hatton, C. (2015, October 26). China’s “social cred-
it”: Beijing sets up huge system. BBC. Retrieved
from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
34592186
Hoffman, S. (2017). Programming China: The Communist
Party’s autonomic approach to managing state secu-
rity.MERICS China Monitor, 44, 1–12.
Hong, S., & Szpunar, P. M. (2019). The futures of anticipa-
tory reason: Contingency and speculation in the sting
operation. Security Dialogue, 50(4), 314–330.
Horkheimer, M. (2004). Eclipse of reason. New York, NY:
Continuum. (Original work published 1947)
Jiang, M. (2020). A brief prehistory of China’s social
credit system. Communication and the Public, 5(3/4),
93–98.
Kostka, G. (2019). China’s social credit systems and pub-
lic opinion: Explaining high levels of approval. New
Media & Society, 21(7), 1565–1593.
Lakatos, I. (1976). Proofs and refutations. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Lauer, J. (2017). Creditworthy: A history of consumer
surveillance and financial identity in America. New
York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Lee, H. (2014). The stranger and the Chinese moral imag-
ination. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Lewis, D. (2019, October 11). All carrots and no sticks:
A case study on social credit scores in Xiamen and




Liang, F., Das, V., & Kostyuk, N. (2018). Constructing a
data-driven society: China’s social credit system as
a state surveillance infrastructure. Policy & Internet,
10(4), 415–453.
Liu, C. (2019).Multiple social credit systems in China. Eco-
nomic Sociology: The European Electronic Newsletter,
21(1), 22–32.
Lowrie, I. (2017). Algorithmic rationality: Epistemology
and efficiency in the data sciences. Big Data & Soci-
ety, 4(1), 1–13.
Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and power. New York, NY:
John Wiley & Sons.
Luhmann, N. (1988). Familiarity, confidence, trust: Prob-
lems and perspectives. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust:
Making and breaking of cooperative relations (pp.
94–107). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Marcuse, H. (2002). One-dimensional man. London:
Routledge. (Original work published 1964)
Mau, S. (2019). The metric society: On the quantification
of the social. Medford, MA: Polity Press.
Mistreanu, S. (2018, April 3). Life inside China’s social
credit laboratory: The party’s massive experiment in
ranking and monitoring Chinese citizens has already
started. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 140–149 148
foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/03/life-inside-chinas-
social-credit-laboratory
Morozow, E. (2014, July 19). The rise of data and the




Nissenbaum, H. (1999). Can trust be secured online? A
theoretical perspective. Etica e Politica, 1(2), 1–15.
Ohlberg, M., Ahmed, S., & Lang, B. (2017). Central plan-
ning, local experiments: The complex implementa-
tion of China’s social credit system. MERICS China
Monitor, 43, 1–15.
O’Neil, C. (2016).Weapons of math destruction: How big
data increases inequality and threatens democracy.
New York, NY: Crown.
O’Reilly, T. (2013). Open data and algorithmic regulation.
In B. Goldstein & L. Dyson (Eds.), Beyond transparen-
cy: Open data and the future of civic innovation (pp.
289–300). San Francisco, CA: Code for America Press.
Pippin, R. B. (1995). On the notion of technology as ide-
ology. In A. Feenberg & A. Hannay (Eds.), Technology
and the politics of knowledge (pp. 43–61). Blooming-
ton, IN: Indiana University Press.
Poppo, L., Zhou, K. Z., & Li, J. J. (2016). When can you
trust “trust”? Calculative trust, relational trust, and
supplier performance. Strategic Management Jour-
nal, 37(4), 724–741.
Porter, T. M. (1996). Trust in numbers: The pursuit of
objectivity in science and public life. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Reigeluth, T. (2014). Why data is not enough: Digital
traces as control of self and self-control. Surveillance
& Society, 12(2), 243–354.
Richardson, R., Schultz, J., & Crawford, K. (2019). Dirty
data, bad predictions: How civil rights violations
impact police data, predictive policing systems,
and justice. New York University Law Review, 94,
192–233.
Rouvroy, A. (2013). The end(s) of critique: Data-
behaviourism vs. due-process. In M. Hildebrandt
& K. De Vries (Eds.), Privacy, due process and the
computational turn: The philosophy of lawmeets the
philosophy of technology (pp. 143–168). Milton Park
and New York, NY: Routledge.
Rouvroy, A., & Stiegler, B. (2016). The digital regime of
truth: From the algorithmic governmentality to a new
rule of law. La Deleuziana: Online Journal of Philoso-
phy, 3, 6–29.
Schur, M., Jones, R. (Writers), & Wright, J. (Direc-
tor). (2016). Nosedive [Television series episode]. In
S. Brooker (Executive producer), Black mirror. Los
Gatos, CA: Netflix.
Seligman, A. B. (1997). The problem of trust. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Weber, M. (1946). Science as vocation. In H. H. Gerth & C.
W. Mills (Eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in sociology
(pp. 129–156). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
(Original work published 1919)
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of
interpretive sociology. Berkeley, CA: University of Cal-
ifornia Press. (Original work published 1921)
Yu, R., Liu, J., & He, F. (2018, June 11). Chengxin
you “jia” shouxin youyong [Integrity is “valuable,”




Sheng Zou is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Michigan’s International Institute.
He received his PhD in Communication from Stanford University. His research interests include global
media industries, digital media and society, platform economy and labor, and emerging technologies.
His current work explores the intersection of governance, politics, and popular culture in digital China,
particularly state-society interactions through new media platforms.
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 140–149 149
